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JURISDICTION

This appeal arises from Carla Lyman's personal injury suit against Marc Solomon
as the personal representative of the estate of Ruthellen Pollan, deceased. The district
court entered an order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment and certifying
it as final. (Case No. 070700106, R. at 396—97.) Carla Lyman timely appealed. (R. at
387—88.) This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78A-4-103 (2009).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court deviated from long-settled
Utah Supreme Court authority when it granted Defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of negligence.
PRESERVATION O F THE ISSUE

Defendant Marc Solomon moved for summary judgment on the issue of
negligence. (R. at 243—61.) Plaintiff Carla Lyman opposed Defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of negligence, thereby preserving the issue presently
before this Court. (R. at 287—98.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate court
"reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary
judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008
v

UT 2, Tf 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In turn, the
appellate court does not accord any deference to the trial court regarding its "resolution of
the legal issues presented . . . and determine^] only whether the trial court erred in
applying the governing law." Ervin v. Lowe's Cos,, 2005 UT App 463, Tj 8, 128 P.3d 11
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also General Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz. v. Tipton,
2007 UT App 109, \ 7, 158 P.3d 1121 ("In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment
. . . we give no deference to the trial court's decision.") cert denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah
2007).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

The question presented on appeal does not raise any constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal.
STATEMENT O F THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Carla Lyman brought suit against the estate of Ruthellen Pollan for injuries that
Ms. Lyman incurred on Ruthellen Pollan's property while Ms. Lyman was serving in her
role as a personal caretaker of Ruthellen Pollan, now deceased. (R. at 003-007.) Ms.
Lyman sued the estate under the theory of negligence based in premises liability. (R. at
005.) Within the complaint, Ms. Lyman alleged that Defendant owed a duty of care to
Ms. Lyman and that Ms. Lyman held the status of a business invitee. (R. at 005-006.)
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Defendant moved for summary judgment on the negligence theory. (R. at 243—
61.) Plaintiff Lyman opposed Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 278—
98.) The district court granted Defendant's motion. (R. at 396—97.)
This appeal follows.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Carla Lyman sued Defendant on September 4, 2007. (Case No. 070700106, R. at
003—007.)
Defendant moved for summary judgment against Carla Lyman. (R. at 243—61.)
Carla Lyman opposed the motion and it was fully briefed. (R. at 287—98.) The district
court heard oral argument on November 30, 2009, and granted Defendant's summary
judgment motion. (R. at 396—97.) The Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment was filed with the Seventh Judicial District Court on December 23,
2009. (R. at 390—91.) The Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment was signed by Judge Anderson and entered by the Trial Court on January 4,
2010.
Carla Lyman timely filed a Notice of Appeal with the Trial Court on December
21,2009. (R. at 387—88.)
STATEMENT O F THE FACTS

On May 21, 2004, Carla Lyman (hereinafter "Carla" or "Plaintiff) was working
as a health care aid for Ruthellen Pollan (hereinafter "Defendant") at Defendant's
residence. (Deposition of Carla Lyman, R. at 264, 42:4-5, 18-19.) Carla had been
vii

working for Defendant since July of 2003. {Id. at 30:5*7.) Upon arrival on the evening
of May 21, 2004, Carla stepped into an indentation in Defendant's uneven driveway
causing her to fall. {Id. at 47:24-48:22.) Carla described the fall in her deposition as
follows:
Carla:

I felt my left foot sliding and it turned. I thought I had ~ and
then I rolled a couple of times and I thought I had hurt my
right knee. And whenever I grabbed it and raised up, and my
foot was on completely backwards.

Attorney:

Did your foot slip on the gravel?

Carla:

No. I think it was the - it was stuck when the other one was
sliding.

Attorney:

Well, which foot slipped?

Carla:

My left foot was just turning, sliding on the gravel.

Attorney:

And that's what caused you to fall?

Carla:

No.

Attorney:

Well, what caused you to fall?

Carla:

I think the hole did, the indention in the roadway.

{Id at 51:7-22.)
Although it was too dark for Carla to see the hole in the driveway, she describes it
as "enough that it caught my left - my right foot and I felt my left foot turning." {Id. at
50:4-5.) Carla clearly recalls that the hole was large enough to catch her right foot,
indicating that she did not merely step into a minor indention in the driveway, but was
actually caught by a hole. Because her right foot was caught in the hole while her left
foot slid, her right foot actually twisted so the foot appeared to be on backwards. {Id. at

viii

62:3-7.) As a result of the fall Carla suffered severe injuries to both of her legs and
incurred significant medical expenses. (Id. at 62:3-63:17.)
Carla testified that the driveway was landscaped by Defendant and that the surface
was uneven "because of the way the road was built." (Id. at 57:11-17.) Defendant had
her driveway landscaped with cobblestones. (Id. at 48:5-18.) The cobblestones were
round, like river rocks, and were of all different shapes and sizes. (Id. at 55:9-56:14.)
Movement and shifts of these stones presumably caused further indentations, unevenness,
holes, and general unpredictability in the surface of the driveway. (Id. at 55:9-16.)
Carla's employment at Defendant's residence involved working several night
shifts. (Id. at 35:25-36:4.) The exact time Carla arrived at Defendant's residence for
work on the evening of May 21, 2004, is unknown, but Carla speculated it to be "around
9:00, 10:00." (Id. at 46:2.) The Defendant had a lamp in her yard at the end of the front
sidewalk, by the driveway. (Id. at 43:24-25.) The lamp was usually lit at night and Carla
remembered the lamp being on the night before she suffered her injuries. (Id. at 44:3-5.)
However, the lamp was unlit on the night of May 21, 2004, the night of the accident. (Id.
at 43:9-18.) Without the light on, Carla testified that at the time of the accident it was
"very dark" and "there was no lights out there." (Id. at 43:9-18.) Carla noted that it was
so dark that her coworker "had a hard time finding [her]" as Carla called for help. (Id. at
43:11, 60:22-61:7.) The coworker, Alisa Alder, in her sworn affidavit confirmed that it
was "very dark" that night, the "driveway was not lit", and she "had a hard time locating
[Carla]" because of the darkness. (Affidavit of Alisa Alder, R. at 221—22.)
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Although Defendant was personally unable to perform maintenance on the
premises, she employed a maintenance person to make repairs at and around the premises
named, Jerry Perez. (Deposition of Carla Lyman, R. at 264, 42: 21-24.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

As indicated by a large body of Utah case law, addressed herein, negligence is
only properly addressed on summary judgment in exceptional circumstances. The facts
presented by this case are not ripe for a summary judgment disposition, so the trial
court's judgment should be reversed.
Utah case law makes clear that landowners such as Defendant owe an elevated
duty of care to business invitees. Because Carla Lyman came to Defendant's premises as
an employee of Defendant, to provide services to Defendant at Defendant's residence,
Carla was a business invitee. Significant questions of fact remain as to whether
Defendant met this heightened duty with regards to providing a safe passageway for
Carla to the residence.
Furthermore, because Defendant made attempts to improve the safety of the
driveway through the addition of a lamp and landscaping the driveway, Defendant
undertook a higher duty, which she was under a duty to discharge non-negligently.
Again, questions of fact remain as to whether Defendant's adjustments to the safety of
the passageway were negligent. Carla is entitled to have such questions of fact answered
by a jury.

x

ARGUMENT

The district court inappropriately granted Defendant's motion for summary
judgment for three primary reasons. First, per longstanding Utah precedent, a question of
negligence is almost always a question to be resolved by a jury; this case presents a
question of negligence not within the ambit of the exception to the general rule.
Secondly, questions of fact remain that preclude the granting of summary judgment.
Third, it is hornbook law that property owners owe an elevated duty of care to their
business invitees; that elevated duty applied, and was breached, in this case. And fourth,
when one endeavors to observe a higher degree of safety on one's property, such an
endeavor must be undertaken non-negligently; Defendant attempted to observe a higher
degree of care, but was negligent in her maintenance of her driveway and her yard lamp.
I.

The Question of Negligence Presented by the Underlying Facts Should not
Have Been Decided on Summary Judgment
Because the underlying action was based on a claim of negligence, it should not

have been disposed of on summary judgment. The facts pled raise questions as to the
duty of care that must be exercised by a landowner in relation to the landowner's
business invitees—such questions of fact must be addressed by a jury.
A.

Summary Judgment Was Improper as this is a Negligence Case

The propriety of summary judgment on a negligence claim has been addressed ad
nauseam by the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of White v.

1

Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994) addressed the rare applicability of
summary judgment in negligence cases, as follows:
[S]ummary judgment is generally inappropriate to resolve negligence
claims and should be employed "only in the most clear-cut case." Ingram v.
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); see also
Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991); Hunt v.
Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990); Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney,
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d
723, 725 (Utah 1985); Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah
Ct.App.1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). "Ordinarily, whether
a Defendant has breached the required standard of care is a question of fact
for the jury." Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982); see also
Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183. "Accordingly, summary judgment is
inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is 'fixed by law,' and
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the Defendant's
negligence under the circumstances." Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825 (citations
omitted); see also Butler v. Sports Haven Int'l, 563 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah
1977).
Id. at 1374.
In this case the trial court's grant of summary judgment was in error. This was not
a "clear-cut case" of nonnegligence. Further, the standard of care in this case is not fixed
by law in a statute. In turn, the question of negligence should have been left to the jury.
B.

There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Which Precludes the Granting of
Summary Judgment in Defendant's Favor

There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant failed to
discharge her duty as it relates to Carla Lyman. A genuine issue of material fact exists
"where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ." West One
Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The Utah Supreme
2

Court has indicated what must happen before a question of negligence may be
determined as a matter of law:
Before the question of negligence becomes one of law, for the court, the
facts shown by the evidence must be such that all reasonable men must
draw the same conclusions from them. If the facts proven are such that
reasonable men may fairly differ as to whether or not there was negligence,
the question is one for the jury to consider.
Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126, 129 (Utah 1967) (internal citation omitted).
In granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court disregarded
a body of facts and case law that supports Carla Lyman's position. As held by extensive
Utah Supreme Court precedent, the question of negligence should not have been resolved
as a matter of law by the trial court.
C.

Plaintiff was Present on Defendant's Premises as a Business Invitee,
Requiring Defendant to Observe an Elevated Duty of Care, Which
Defendant Breached

Defendant owed an elevated duty of care to Carla Lyman as a business invitee to
Defendant's home. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly established when a possessor of
land is subject to liability for injuries of invitees, in accord with Restatement (Second) of
Torts §343:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his
invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the
exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize
that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b)
should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to
protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to
protect them against the danger.
3

Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, If 8, 116 P.3d 263, citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts §343.
Carla Lyman was on Defendant's property for the benefit of Defendant. She was
Defendant's invitee. Carla Lyman's status as a business invitee avails her of the benefit
of a higher standard of care while on Defendant's property. The drafters of the
Restatement section addressed above provide the following insight relating to invitees on
a landowner's property:
As stated in § 342, the possessor owes to a licensee only the duty to
exercise reasonable care to disclose to him dangerous conditions which are
known to the possessor, and are likely not to be discovered by the licensee.
To the invitee the possessor owes not only this duty, but also the additional
duty to exercise reasonable affirmative care to see that the premises are safe
for the reception of the visitor, or a least to ascertain the condition of the
land, and to give such warning that the visitor may decide intelligently
whether or not to accept the invitation, or may protect himself against the
danger if he does accept it.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. b.
Defendant breached the duty owed to Carla Lyman by failing to assure the yard
light was functional to allow Carla safe passage to the home and by failing to maintain
the condition of the landscaped driveway. Further, the driveway as-landscaped presented
a permanent unsafe condition, due to the nature of the rocks that compose the driveway—
river rocks are rounded rocks, and as such, they present a constant danger for individuals
who are forced to walk over the same in order to reach Defendant's front door. See
Canfieldv. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding grocer liable
under permanent unsafe condition for slip and fall victim's injuries arising from slip on
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lettuce leaves; leaves were present on floor due to method of display that lead to
possibility of lettuce leaves being strewn on floor where customers would walk) (cited
with approval, but not applied, in Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, \ 26, 196 P.3d 576).
In the event the danger to Carla is deemed open and obvious, such a finding does
not completely bar her recovery, as Utah is a comparative fault state. See Hale v.
Beckstead, 2005 UT 24 at If 39. Even if a danger is open and obvious, if a landowner
should expect that an invitee will fail to protect herself against a dangerous condition,
Defendant must exercise reasonable care to protect her. See id. at 125.
Defendant owed Carla Lyman an elevated duty of care to maintain the safety of
her property, to reasonably assure the property was safe for Carla, and to warn Carla of
any dangers. Defendant failed to ensure that the light was functioning, that the driveway
stones were in place, and also failed to warn Carla of any dangers. In turn, Defendant
breached her duty to Carla.
The district court improperly prevented the question of breach of care from
reaching the jury in this case. As discussed in Section I above, a question of negligence
in regard to an ordinary standard of care is, almost without fail, not appropriately dealt
with on summary judgment. In light of the elevated duty of care presently applicable,
summary judgment is even more suspect. The question of negligence in this case should
have been submitted to the jury; failing to do so is reversible error.
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D.

Defendant Assumed an Elevated Duty of Care, Which She Failed to
Observe in a Nonnegligent Fashion

Defendant undertook an elevated level of care when she installed a yard lamp to
illuminate the walkway to her home and installed river rocks to form the base of her
driveway. Defendant failed to maintain the elevated level of care in a nonnegligent
fashion and thereby caused Carla Lyman's injuries. Utah courts have consistently upheld
the common law view that individuals are only under a duty to act reasonably in regard to
others' safety unless there is a higher statutorily-imposed duty or unless the individual
undertakes a higher duty; in the event the individual undertakes a higher duty, the duty
must be undertaken nonnegligently. See, e.g., Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic, LLC,
2008 UT 21, \ 16, 182 P.3d 333 (holding that once a therapist acted, in spite of lack of
duty, she had an obligation to do so nonnegligently); Conrad v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co., 542 P.2d 1090, 1090-91 (Utah 1975) (holding that by undertaking to keep sidewalk
level, bank owed duty to plaintiff to keep sidewalk level, and that whether bank breached
duty was question for jury).
In this case, Defendant undertook a duty to maintain her landscaped driveway, and
sidewalk lighting, to avoid exposing Carla Lyman and others to danger.
Defendant undertook the duty to keep the mode of entry to her home lit by
maintaining her yard lamp with a functioning light bulb. Additionally, Defendant
undertook the duty to make the driveway more passable than the customary gravel- and
sand-based driveway by using river rocks; in undertaking these elevated duties,
Defendant was required to do so in a nonnegligent manner. By failing to keep the light at
6

the end of her sidewalk operational and lit on the night at issue and failing to assure that
the river rocks that formed the base for the driveway did not leave dangerous holes in the
driveway, Defendant breached the higher duty she owed to Carla Lyman, causing severe
and permanent injuries.
Holding Defendant liable for failing to adequately maintain the yard lamp and the
river rock driveway does not expand landowners' duties to their invitees to require
landowners to light their yards and landscape their drives. It does not expand
landowners' potential liability. Rather, it simply echoes the longstanding view that
landowners who undertake a duty must do so nonnegligently.
In turn, the trial court's decision was in error and Defendant's motion for summary
judgment should not have been granted on the issue of negligence.
CONCLUSION

As discussed in the sections above, the trial court erred in entering summary
judgment in favor of Defendant as Utah case law paired with the present facts clearly
militate against the rendering of summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Therefore,
this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
DATED this V*

day of July, 2010.

M
KENNETH D. LOUGEE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Plaintiffs Address:
Carla Lyman
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5664 South Green Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this -Jtr

day of July, 2010,1 caused to be served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to:
Jaryl L. Rencher
STUCKI, STEELE, PIA,
ANDERSON & RENCHER
Wells Fargo Building
299 S. Main Street, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 961-1300

ADDENDUM

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Seventh Judicial District
Court of San Juan County, State of Utah, Civil No. 070700106, Judge Lyle R. Anderson,
dated December 7,2009.
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Kevin S. Gardner #6230
STUCKI, STEELE, PIA, ANDERSON & RENCHER
299 S. Main Street, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 961-1300
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

CARLA LYMAN,

:
)

Plaintiff,

]

v.

'
[
'

MARC SOLOMON, as personal
representative of the ESTATE OF
RUTHELLEN POLLAN, deceased,

;[
;
;

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Civil No. 070700106
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendant.

THIS COURT, having received and duly considered Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment with supporting and reply memoranda, as well as Plaintiffs memorandum in
opposition to the motion, and having set this matter for oral argument on November 30, 2009 at
1:00 p.m., Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court for hearing duly
noticed. Defendant appeared by counsel Kevin S. Gardner. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel
appeared at the hearing. After hearing oral argument from Defendant's counsel, the Court
entered its Order as follows:

1.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

DATED this 7th day of December, 2009.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on
day of December, 2009 I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the attached and foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following

David C. Biggs
STEELE & BIGGS
OF COUNSEL TO SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5664 South Green Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84123
Kenneth Lougee
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5664 South Green Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84123
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